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Günter Zöller, Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy: The Original Duplicity of 
Intelligence and Will. Modem European Philosophy Series. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
This brief, but lucidly written and well-argued volume collects 
together eight essays on Fichte's Jena systems. The essays were 
individually authored, but fit together haml0niously to present a more 
or less seamless view of Fichte' s philosophical achievements 1794-
1800. Zöller's constant reference back to Kant's understanding of 
transcendental philosophy is one of the book's unifying elements; 
constant attention to the difference between the well-known first Jena 
system (Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794/95) and 
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the recently available second system (Wissenschaftslehre nova 
methodo, 1796/99) is the other unifying device. 
 
The first of Zöller's interpretive guide stars is Kant's 
transcendental project: the attempt to deduce a thick theory of human 
knowing by asking after the conditions that must be supposed on the 
side of the knowing subject in order to account for human cognition 
and willing. Fichte early on decided to broaden the Kantian project by 
asking after not only the subjective, but the objective conditions of 
cognition, so that both self and world are elucidated by the 
philosopher's postulation and subsequent analysis of a complex of 
conditions which one might call the ‘worldknot’ of experience. Key to 
Fichte' s idiosyncratic use of “transcendental method” is the seeming 
arbitrariness or sheer freedom of the initial postulation of a dense 
synthesis and the virtually inexhaustible stream of analysis that is 
generated in its unraveling. For Fichte, philosophical elucidation (or 
analysis) of the enduring synthesis justifies the initial posit of free 
activity or the ascent from empirical awareness to its transcendental 
conditions; philosophy thus generates a seemingly inexhaustible 
discourse that illuminates but in no sense dissolves the prediscursive 
knot of self and world. Nowhere does it attempt, much less  
achieve, an exhibition of a transcendent origin for the ‘worldknot’. A 
simple or unitary source for either awareness or objectivity is beyond 
reach; the transcendental field that opens up in experience and which 
is clarified by philosophy is their ultimate and irreversible 
interdependence. Zöller clearly understands Kant's project and Fichte's 
fidelity to it even as he widened its scope and undermined its 
transphenomenal implications. Zöller' s identification with this Kantian 
basis provides a secure foundation for his more detailed explorations 
of Fichte's Jena writings. 
 
Zöller's other guide star is Fichte's rejection of the ultimate 
difference between theory and practice, or cognition and willing. Under 
the banner of Kant's methodological dictum “the primacy of the 
practical,” Fichte offered, starting in 1795, a model of cognition in 
which the basic structure of presentation (including primitive 
awareness and its focal differentiation into subject and object) is an 
offshoot of a spontaneity or free activity that is self-affecting; this 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Fichte-Studien, Vol 25 (November 2005): pg. 216-228. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
3 
 
primitive self-affection he called ‘feeling,’ equally the ground of 
cognitive presentation and conative relation. 
 
It is on the basis of these two transformed Kantian 
problematics, the complementary difference between intelligence and 
will and the interactive difference between subject and object in 
transcendental world construction, that Zöller formulates the book's 
thesis: following out Kant's hints about the mutually conditioning 
structure of consciousness and the worlds it both creates and 
experiences, Fichte points to a complex of mutually distinguishing but 
interrelated activities, intelligence and will, as the complicated point of 
origin for both the experienced world of freedom and the world of fact. 
This complementarity is the “original duplicity of intelligence and will” 
of the book's subtitle, which Zöller better explains as “essential 
cooperation: [which means that] the original duplicity is at the same 
time an original complicity.” Perhaps the English terminology Zöller 
employs for this task is unfortunate; ‘duplicity’ and ‘complicity’ carry 
negative connotation when used, as they typically are in common 
speech, to describe human behavior. 
 
Zöller divides his discussion into four parts, the first concerned 
with Fichte's relation to Kant and with the methodology of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, the second with the relation of knowing and doing, 
the third with the parallel relation between intelligence and willing, and 
the fourth specifically with willing in general and the ‘pure will.’ In all 
these essays, one of his main concerns is to show the continuity in 
Fichte's thought between the first presentation of Wissenschaftslehre 
in 1794/95 and the »new presentation« of 1796/99. 
 
The first of the two essays on what Wissenschaftslehre attempts 
to do deals with Fichte' s programmatic and critical essays, 1794-
1801; these are On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre (1794), the 
First Introduction to the Attempt at a New Presentation (1797), and 
the 1801 Crystal Clear Report to the Public. Fichte detected a crucial 
flaw in Kant's philosophy, argues Zöller. As he expanded the compass 
of his philosophy, Kant did not stay true to the methodology of the 
First Critique, transcendental idealism, but strayed into a »critically 
mitigated nonempirical realism« in his treatments of morals and of 
aesthetic and scientific teleology. Even in the First Critique 
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transcendental idealism remains a theory about the form of sensibility, 
spatial-temporal intuition. Since Kant failed to extend the methodology 
to the treatment of the categories, the general approach of inquiring 
into the grounds of possibility for a phenomenon or its constitutive 
elements — supposedly Kant's claim to fame — is not exploited in the 
treatment of the intellectual elements (concepts, principles, 
judgments) within the domains of feeling, cognition and volition. 
 
In light of Kant's methodological failure, then, Fichte conceives 
his Wissenschaftslehre as a radicalized transcendental philosophy, one 
which gives scientific or systematic form to human cognition and 
action by depicting the origin of consciousness (and its contents) in 
laws that are mind-given. The methodology of such an account is 
constructive and ‘transcendental’, since the philosopher freely deploys 
abstraction and reflection upon her experience. On this basis two 
mutually exclusive philosophical accounts are seen to be equally 
possible: an idealism based on the primacy of the I, or a realism based 
on the primacy of the thing-in-itself. The choice between the two is left 
an existentialist imperative: “Choose what you will be!”, or rather, 
make your choice on the basic of the human being you already are. 
This leads Fichte to advance an idealist philosophy based on the notion 
that the self is radically independent, spontaneous activity. Knowledge 
is thus constructed according to a law that the intelligent being “gives 
itself its own laws in the course of its acting.” Zöller also notes that in 
Fichte's hands, ‘critique’ (which in Kant's hands was mostly critique of 
metaphysics) becomes ‘metacritique,’ inquiry into the possibility, rules 
and conditions of a philosophy (in this case, mostly critique of natural 
consciousness). The project takes the form of a deliberative 
philosophical reconstruction of cognition as it occurs in life , or the 
elaboration of a system that exists only in and through reflection. 
Fichte terms such a reflective system Fichte a ‘fiction’, a picture of 
consciousness as if it were elaborated according to abstract principles 
or mind-given laws. 
 
Zöller's second essay, “An Eye for an I” covers some of the 
same ground. Given the nature of his material and the stubborn fact 
that Fichte's philosophy, to be understood at all, must be understood 
as a series of changes worked upon Kant's philosophy, some basic 
points about Fichte's notion of philosophy as Wissenschaftslehre 
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(theory of knowledge) and of Wissenschaftslehre as idealism can bear 
repeating. But remarks offered here about the experimental nature of 
Fichte's project are new and illuminating. Unlike other domains of 
explanation, philosophy's object here is not ready to hand, but must 
first be achieved by employing a method of abstraction (systematically 
disregarding what is merely empirical) and reflection (focusing on what 
is nonempirical). The double method leads to a distinction between 
two series of acts in the philosophical experiment, those of the 
individual I of the philosopher doing the experiment and those of the 
preindividual I upon which the experiment is conducted. The 
philosopher discovers, by experimenting on his own mind — or rather 
by experimentally uncovering in his own mind that which is not his 
own — a general structure of consciousness. As Fichte used to urge his 
(no doubt somewhat bewildered) students, “Think yourself, and 
observe how you do that.” Following out this abstractive- 
reflective methodology, Fichte fashions a philosophical reconstruction 
of the I that mirrors its natural complexity. The anti-foundationist 
legitimation (or ‘deduction’) of this endeavor is provided by the 
convergence of the I's principled self-construction and the 
reconstruction of empirical consciousness and its objects — ultimately 
by the deduction of an individual, empirically concrete I that is 
bounded by an interaction with other intelligent beings and awakened 
to independent agency through an interactive ‘solicitation’ of rational 
agents, one upon the other. 
 
A latter section of this second essay attempts, for the first time, 
to integrate Fichte's work in 1794 with the new perspective of the 
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. Where the earlier work has three 
more of less discordant principles derived from “facts of 
consciousness” — an absolute I, a not-land the limited or divisible I 
which is their synthesis, all dynamically integrated in the striving to 
eliminate the not-I — the new version of Wissenschaftslehre begins 
from the postulation of basic principles that are nonempirically intuited 
or given in “intellectual intuition.” Though on a Kantian understanding, 
the philosopher's claim to intellectual intuition sounds preposterous 
(since human intuitions are sensible only, according to him, while 
concepts are devoid of content), Fichte uses the term to primarily 
signify the original structure of the land only derivatively to signify the 
philosopher's grasp of the nature of the pure I. “Intellectual intuition” 
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means that the I is a knowing that is a doing, and equally a doing that 
is a knowing — or, more technically, that its very being is to posit itself 
as positing. Intellectual intuition thus involves an immediate and 
prereflective self-consciousness; this is the property of the pure I, the 
I as such, not the mediated self-consciousness that comes to the 
empirical I in reflection. Fichte expresses this insight, tantalizingly, 
through a simile: the I is an eye, a mirror that mirrors itself, so that 
whatever we see, “we see everything in us, we see only ourselves, 
only as acting.” Zöller is admirably clear that, despite the fact that the 
pure I is the original consciousness involved in every other 
consciousness, it is not accessible at the empirical level but must be 
inferred by philosophical reflection directed back upon on empirical 
consciousness. In assessing the project of the Wissenschaftslehre, 
Zöller notes that though one might read Fichte's work in its initial 
moves as a solipsistic idealism, all it really does is to ‘deduce’ (or 
heuristically elucidate) a generic form of subjectivity that must be 
factually instantiated by a community of interacting individuals on the 
ethical and social-political level, a community under law, and on an 
ultimate metaphysical level, by a harmoniously coordinated realm of 
spirits. 
 
A third essay explores themes common to both versions of the 
Jena Wissenschaftslehre, ‘positing’ and ‘determining.’ Fichte's use of 
'positing’ to designate the grounding dimension of knowledge in the 
1794/95 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre is novel. Zöller 
traces its roots back to controversies between Reinhold and Schulze on 
the possibility of a first principle for all philosophy, and to Fichte's wish 
to embed the cognitive or theoretical wholly in the practical. Strictly 
speaking, it is only the absolute I that ‘posits’ itself, and this I is called 
I only in anticipation of the empirical location of consciousness that 
emerges from the more metaphorical ‘positings’ of not-land the finite, 
determinable I. Fichte's thought is not radically egological here, as it 
will be in the nova methodo system, stresses Zöller. The I' s self-
positing instead points toward a ground of spontaneous, self-reverting 
activity. Fichte introduces the concept of ‘determination’ when he 
moves to the construction of the limited or finite I out of the opposition 
of the I's self-positing and the not-I's posited in opposition to it. The 
theoretical and practical parts of the theory are elaborated as the play 
between the finite land the (apparently) opposed not-I. In the 
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theoretical section, determination is the logic of the play between the 
sheer positing of the absolute land the apparent passivity of the 
limited I in the face of the not-I. The ‘reality’ of the not-I turns out not 
to be explicable on theoretical grounds; the passivity of the I in 
presentation is presupposed by, but does not explain, the not-I's 
standing. Only the 1795 Wissenschaftslehre's practical part — where 
Fichte invokes elements such as the action of “something alien,” or 
‘feeling,’ or the self-finitizing character of the I as intelligence — 
approaches the accomplishment of this quite problematic deduction. 
Fichte's solutions here are not very satisfactory at that: there is space 
for a not-I only because the I posits itself as self-posited, a situation 
that Zöller opaquely calls “auto-predicative positing” or, more plainly, 
reflection. Reflection is the I's fundamental trait, viz., attending to its 
own activity. Fichte is hardly clear about how finitude and determinacy 
enter in here, but Zöller is correct in looking to the “check” in the 
theoretical domain and “obligation” in the practical as the closest 
Fichte gets to finding a transcendental ground of determinacy. 
 
Zöller devotes a fourth essay to Fichte's philosophy of action 
and his ethics, noting that though Fichte wished to exert a ‘real-life’ 
moral influence upon his students and through them, upon social and 
political life, the two-part practical philosophy expounded in the 
1796/97 Foundations of Natural Law and the 1798 System of Ethics is 
a transcendental theory of action, not a normative ethics. The basic 
prepersonal structure of consciousness, elucidated in the 
Wissenschaftslehre itself, permits a description of the conditions of 
moral knowledge and action. Whereas Kant had used the term ‘reason’ 
to describe the set of a priori conditions that underlie empirical 
cognition, Fichte uses the term ‘I’ to signify the radical heterogeneity 
between the transcendental ground of cognition and action — a 
“super-I” of sorts — and the empirical cognition and action seen in the 
finite human person. Since for both Kant and Fichte, individualized 
human consciousness is situated in the middle of a continuum of 
social-communal interactions, the reason or ‘I’ that is its explanatory 
ground is a tension of infinity and finitude. This transcendental ground 
enacts itself as a process of self-realization within the finite, the salient 
feature of which is a juxtaposition of subjectivity and objectivity that is 
in turn mirrored at a higher level in the opposition of theoretical and 
practical consciousness. The factors distinguished in this analysis exist 
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as united in consciousness: the finite agent's action is based on the 
nature of consciousness as such, while at the same time it is 
conditioned by the interpersonal actions and barriers of concrete social 
life. Transcendentally viewed, action involves a many-sided provision 
for, and simultaneous limitation upon, the freedom of individuals. 
What Fichte tries to do in his practical philosophy is explain why 
rationality must be embodied in a society of coordinated but free 
individuals, why no model of freedom other than this socially situated 
self-limitation (for the sake of the possibility of others’ free action) can 
count as rational that is, as exhibiting the deep structure of the I as 
such. 
 
The basic strategy of Fichte's practical philosophy, argues Zöller, 
is to argue that morally constrained action is both a condition for and a 
consequence of self-conscious rationality. This two-sided 
argumentation is reminiscent of the regressive and progressive 
treatments of the nature of consciousness in the transcendental 
deductions of Kant's first Critique. Basic to Fichte's view of the 
transcendental I is that it is a two-sided synthesis of agility (the 
spontaneity of subjectivity) and intelligence (the dual and object-
oriented nature of consciousness). Since this knot is never to be 
untied, much less cut, consciousness appears in the finite individual as 
both knowing and acting. Self-knowledge must, therefore, be 
ultimately characterized as the knowing of the agent by the agent in 
the midst of its act: “I find myself as myself only [in] willing.” From 
the side of its content too, action displays this same self-knotting or 
self-locating character: consciousness simultaneously gives itself a 
world in (and against) which to act and gives itself the task of 
attaining total independence within it. Morality becomes the translation 
of the I's unconditional spontaneity into a categorical “ought”: I ought 
to determine my freedom according to the concept of total 
independence. Freedom becomes the basic goal of action, and mutual 
freedom of a plurality of agents under the constraint of law its socially 
embodied agenda. 
 
The remaining essays in the volume explore in more detail 
Fichte's version of the grand project of German philosophy after 
Leibniz, to present subjectivity and its structure as fundamental 
ontology, and in particular the interrelation between intelligence and 
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will which Zöller finds at the core of Fichte's Jena systems. The fifth 
essay, “Willing as Thinking”, explores the account of willing and 
thinking that Fichte offered in the revisions of and metaphilosophical 
reflections upon the 1794/95 Wissenschaftslehre. These are found 
chiefly in the two “Introductions” of 1797/98 and the nova methodo 
lectures of 1796/99. These texts focus on the phenomenon of thinking 
as the entry-point into philosophy (rather than the abstract 1 and not-
I of the earlier version) and the closely associated theme of willing. 
Starting out, as Kant had, to furnish a system of what is necessary in 
experience, Fichte calls upon his reader to think for herself the ‘ground 
of experience’. Such a ground is never actually given or ready to hand, 
but must be enacted by the individual who is invited to, in Fichte's 
famous words, “think yourself, and notice how you do this.” This 
simultaneous abstraction and reflection initiates one into the 
philosopher' s activity, experimentally constructing a pure I that is 
simple self-positing or self-reversion. 
 
The philosopher's experiment produces “intellectual intuition,” 
immediate knowledge of the I's original activity, a knowledge not yet 
worked up by concepts. Like Kant's sensible intuition, this intellectual 
self-intuition is blind, and needs to have the determinacy of concepts 
added in order to become what it is: concrete individual subjectivity. 
Thinking, then, works upon the inchoate presence supplied by 
intellectual intuition, and brings to a stand, defines and determines the 
sheer activity of the latter. It proceeds by way of the principle of 
determinability or opposition, the strategy of moving back from every 
determinate aspect to the unspecified or merely determinable state 
that preceded it and is its ground. Fichtean ‘thinking,’ argues Zöller 
thus alternately employs two principles, the principle of grounding and 
the principle of opposition. 
 
As applied to the I itself or to pure I-hood, thinking involves 
agility or the activity of determination. It consists in a transition or 
going-over from determinability to determination on the part of the I, 
or its unfolding in a progressive series of free self-determinations. In 
this thinking, the only thing the I intuits is these free activities which, 
however, all have a double structure: in one aspect the activity is 
constructive or productive (‘real activity’), while in another it observes 
itself (‘ideal activity’). That both of these activities can occur only by 
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accompanying one another is the ‘original duplicity’ of the I, the 
feature whereby it is subject-objectivity. That they are the inevitable 
features of the sole I that enacts itself is the ‘absolute identity’ of the 
I. Against this background of the I's original double nature, the closely 
associated features of thinking and willing can be displayed. Though 
one can distinguish deliberation from willing in a narrow sense, Fichte 
insists that willing is a kind of thinking, viz., self-determined thinking. 
Yet Fichte's whole concept of thinking is volitional in a sense too, since 
thinking is nothing other than free self-determination. Thinking is, 
among other things, willing, while willing is always a species of 
thinking. 
 
Zöller completes this quite abstract account of the inter-
involvement of wiling and thinking with an explanation of pure willing, 
the synthesis of absolute freedom and facticity whereby the I finds 
itself having to freely act within a determinate situation not of its 
choosing. It is this pure willing that underlies the I's thinking and 
functions as the explanatory ground of consciousness. Though 
characterized as volitional (and thus determinable), pure will has an 
intellectual (or determined) aspect whereby the I appears as a finite I 
juxtaposed to a plurality of other I's. The social conditions of finite 
existence, then, represent a ‘sensification’ of the will. Thinking poses 
the question of how a rational being can explain its possibility; the only 
answer available is cast in terms of perpetual but oblique reference to 
a community of consciousness, where the I is always shadowed and 
summoned by its other, which is equally the I. 
 
The sixth essay returns to familiar ground, but recasts materials 
already presented under two headings: the character of consciousness 
as both subject and object of its thinking, and the nature of its 
thinking as both real (finite) and ideal (absolute). These themes are 
pursued especially through the 1796/99 Wissenschaftslehre nova 
methodo lectures. A seventh essay, »Determination to Self-
Determination, »picks up the thread of the I's situated willing and 
follows it through the Ethics and the nova methodo lectures. Zöller 
begins by again situating Fichte's philosophy within its Kantian 
heritage, transcendental philosophy, here interpreted not as a local 
strategy within the account of cognition, but as a broad framework for 
explaining human practice in the widest, social-political as well as 
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moral, perspective. Fichte translates Kant's slogan “the primacy of the 
practical” into a transcendental theory of the subject that underscores 
the role of will. Zöller begins his account of the practical philosophy 
with the content-neutral description of the moral law (dating back to 
the 1793 edition of Critique of All Revelation) as a constant striving 
toward action, driven by an interaction between will as such and a 
‘sensory drive.’ For Fichte, a drive endows a presented matter, in this 
case sensory perceptions, with a form; the synthesis achieved imposes 
a eudaimonistic calculus on the sensory presentations and imbues the 
activities of the embodied I with a prudential order. This order is 
subjected to the I's free choices as well, explained by a pure drive, 
“willing because one wills.” Both these levels of embodied willing are in 
turn subject to the absolute spontaneity of a transcendental freedom, 
which guarantees the independence of the I's practical determination 
from the laws of nature. It is easy to see that in this early account, 
Fichte closely follows the path of Kant's moral philosophy. 
 
Zöller turns again to the 1798 System of Ethics for a clearer 
picture of willing. While the 1794/95 Foundations of the Entire Science 
of Knowledge presented a synthesis or ideal unity underlying concrete 
consciousness, the Ethics begins with finite consciousness or subject-
objectivity and presents the various activities of the I, theoretical and 
practical, as so many views or aspects of that ideal unity. The subject 
as thinking finds itself in the place of the object, as thought, in the 
situation of willing; the consciousness of this thinking-willing is my first 
direct self-experience. Claiming he is unable to give a theoretical or 
real explanation of this situated activity, Fichte appeals to ‘intellectual 
intuition,’ one's experience of one's self-givenness. Zöller describes 
this somewhat cryptically as a “voluntaristic conception of thinking and 
[a] corresponding intellectualistic conception of willing.” Generally 
following Kant's moral philosophy, Fichte describes this willing as 
autonomous in three distinct ways: it consists in free choices, made 
under the conceptual determination of the moral law, which in turn 
furthers the I's basic drive toward self-realization. Fichte followed 
Reinhold's reading of Kantian practical philosophy in this respect, 
replacing a moral psychology that opposed a ‘selfish’ drive to an 
‘unselfish’ drives with a three-part scheme: one basic drive (to self-
realization) is doubly instantiated as a ‘natural drive’ (empirical 
causality as displayed in nature) and a ‘purely intellectual drive’ (the 
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willed impulse toward the execution of an act). Ethical action then 
becomes a willed appropriation of the natural drive, or the overlay of 
will upon natural forces. While this account does not explain the 
particular content of any action, it structurally explains the causal 
efficacy of free will within a natural order in terms more elegant than 
Kant's talk of the ‘supersensible causality’ of the will. 
 
Zöller continues this meditation on willing into the nova method 
lectures, where the idea of the finitude or situatedness of original 
willing is spelled out in its mental and corporeal aspects. Fichte here 
again replaces opaque Kantian talk of supersensible and sensible 
worlds, but with an equally opaque language of ‘ascending’ and 
‘descending’ orders of activity. Zöller points to one virtue ofthis 
account, that: Kant's perplexing talk of the noumenal in quasi-
ontological terms is turned into a pure exercise of thought: an 
intelligible world is invoked as a pure ens rationis to explain the 
unexplainable, the original determination of the I to concreteness or 
physically and socially situated experience. 
 
The collection's final essay, “The Unity of Intelligence and 
Will”, finally brings Zöller's interpretive thesis to plain statement: 
Fichte radically extended Kant's program for unearthing the 
transcendental conditions of experience into an integrated account of 
the conditioning structures of consciousness and of the worlds of 
cognition and action to which they give rise. Fichte's effort is 
nonreductive (and non-foundational): his account retains the 
complexity of the two lived worlds even in formulating their principles, 
so that an »original duplicity of intelligence and will« is offered as the 
explanation of the interlocked, complementary worlds of experience 
and freedom. In this culminating essay, Zöller traces the theme of 
unity and complementarity through the nova methodo lectures and the 
1800 Vocation of Man. 
 
In his lectures of 1796/99 on Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte 
introduced a parity of thinking and willing, founded on an analysis of 
intellect as equally requiring ideal (cognitive) and real (volitional) 
activities. From the first, however, willing is subordinated to thinking, 
or cast in the form of thinking. Thought takes willing as its original 
object and assumes the complicated stance of willing thought, or the 
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thinking of willing. Zöller proceeds to explain this complicated idea in 
two parallel ways: a meditation upon Fichte's noumenalism and one on 
thinking as synthetic unity. 
 
Fichte's ‘noumenalism’ is a complicated affair, part of an 
ascending account of cognition (and willing) in preindividual or 
abstract terms. The activity of thinking is to determine the 
determinable, but thought itself produces the determinable in and 
through the workings of the imagination. As it delimits and defines the 
determinate, thinking produces objects or the sense world, but it does 
so only by juxtaposing it to an intelligible world of noumena. 
‘Noumena’ signifies not things that are objective and transcendent, as 
in Kant, but immanent or transcendental structures — similar to Kant' 
s transcendental object or its correlated transcendental subject-that 
provide, as it were, the template for the synthesis of experience. From 
a purely transcendental point of view, then, it is a threefold thinking 
that imbues sensible object with intelligible relations — the thinking of 
willing, of phenomena, and of noumena. This ascending (or pure 
transcendental account) of consciousness is mirrored by a descending 
(or transcendental-historical) account, wherein the will is seen to 
produce first determinateness, then individuality, then concrete 
situation of its individual Gestalt in a spatio-temporal locus. Just as the 
ascending account subjected the sensible to the intelligible, so the 
descending account subordinates the intelligible to the sensible and 
regards the volitional world of individualized consciousness as the 
materialization or ‘sensification’ of the noumenal. 
 
Much in this account is highly abstract and preliminary. A 
second section on ‘synthetic thinking’ takes the theme of thinking and 
willing toward the finite, situated and individual character of self-
consciousness. It is synthetic thinking that gives rise first to a series of 
explanatory (or presupposed) distinctions such as synthesis and 
analysis, free thinking and constrained thinking, determination and 
determinacy. These »duplicities« in turn account for the distinctions 
that characterized finite, individuated consciousness: knowing and 
willing, mind and body, self and world. The synthetic thinking behind 
these distinguished items is both formal and material: it produces the 
determinable as such (Kant's sensible manifold) and determines it 
through thinking. Synthetic thinking, then, is the Wissenschaftslehre 
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nova methodo's replacement for the cumbersome and abstract triple 
positings of the 1794/95 Grundlage. 
 
The ‘thinking’ of synthetic thinking both introduces finitude and 
temporality into pure will, and prescribes the law of finite being as 
well: to be determined to self-determination. It poses the original 
limitation of willing or the primary task of acting over against that 
limitation. Zöller explains how this unfolds as feeling, the situated 
character of finite individuality, and how this is further specified as 
‘solicitation to freedom’. Willing realizes itself as a community of 
individuals in dynamic interaction; the concrete or appearing form of 
individual consciousness is a finite willing, challenged to free activity in 
interaction with other similar beings. Personality thus manifests within 
interpersonality, subjectivity within intrasubjectivity. Other wills 
function in the second Jena Wissenschaftslehre as noumena, meaning 
both entities of thought and entities that are in their own right thinking 
beings. If individuation involves being determined by another whom I 
think, ultimately individuation is fully accounted for by an ultimate 
Other, a first individual, an incomprehensible or inexplicable being. 
Nonetheless, insists Zöller, all of this explanation is deployed within 
the space of thinking or pure willing, or as Fichte put it, “Everything is 
appearance, even the I itself.” The determining dual aspects, the 
others, the transphenomenal ultimate Other are all noumena-entities 
presupposed by and determined inside thinking. Though it gets 
noticeably harder to detect Kant in the background, all of Fichte's 
moves in the second Jena system are still transcendental explanation: 
seeing what must be presupposed within consciousness in order to 
explain the very consciousness one is experiencing. 
 
Zöller closes off this difficult but valuable chapter with a brief 
investigation of the popular 1800 essay, Vocation of Man. Fichte there 
integrates basic descriptions of the cognitive terrain (“knowledge”) and 
of the moral-practical domain (now called “faith”) with meditations on 
freedom and the ultimate ground of interpersonal community. These 
latter show the influence of Jacobi's “philosophy of faith,” and respond 
to some of the charges raised against transcendental idealism in the 
Atheismusstreit that forced Fichte to migrate from Jena to Berlin. They 
also prefigure the different and difficult turn Fichte's thinking takes in 
1801, where the nonfinite ground of individuation and the 
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interpersonal character of finite thinkers relative to one another are 
explained as an “intelligible world.” Zöller claims this essay recaptures 
some of the early influence that Jacobi's essays and novels had worked 
on Fichte, moderating the claims of reason or knowledge in favor of 
those of feeling and belief. Jacobi's influence may also explain some of 
the proto-romantic or proto-existential cast of Fichte's thought. 
 
What can be said of Zöller's efforts in this book? That the 
individual essays are careful, that individual items within Fichte’ 
thinking are brought to lucid account is beyond doubt. No can one fault 
the book on the grounds of omission: all of the themes, the major 
explanatory strategies Fichte employs, all of his proliferating 
terminology are brought into the tapestry of the discussion. 
 
One cannot help wishing, however, that Zöller had written one 
book instead of collecting eight essays-were it possible for him to do 
so. The fact that Fichte himself was forever incapable of producing a 
final presentation of Wissenschaftslehre, that his philosophy remained 
ever project and not product testifies against that possibility. As Zöller 
rightly emphasizes, the wish to represent and explain the complexity 
of consciousness without reduction or oversimplification is essential to 
Fichte's vision of his task. A false philosophy can be simple, and a 
simple philosophy is likely to be false to what it represents and 
explains. At least as Fichte does it, philosophical thinking is both free 
and overdetermined. I doubt that there is a way for the scholar to 
avoid the excesses of Fichte's thinking too many explanations, too 
many levels of analysis, too much argumentation, too many 
synonymous terms and two many complementary (or ‘duplicitous’) 
explananda and still engage its core. Zöller's plural essays are 
valuable, each by itself and all taken together. Each will repay the 
reader's serious effort. I have tried to summarize each essay 
extensively so that each reader can choose the thread she judges 
most reliable to gain entrance to the labyrinth; whether she can 
emerge again from the labyrinth, once entered, is best judged 
empirically. 
